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Abstract
We investigate relationships between versions of derivability condi-
tions for provability predicates. We show several implications and non-
implications between the conditions, and we discuss unprovability of con-
sistency statements induced by derivability conditions. Among other
things, we improve Buchholz’s schematic proof of provable Σ1-completeness.
1 Introduction
In his famous paper [8], Go¨del proved the second incompleteness theorem with
only a sketched proof. Go¨del explained that by formalizing his proof of the
first incompleteness theorem, the consistency statement ∃x(Fml(x) ∧ ¬PrT (x))
saying “there exists a T -unprovable formula” cannot be proved in T if T is
consistent. To carry out his idea, it is desirable that the formula PrT (x) enjoys
some natural properties as a formalization of the notion of T -provability. He
wrote that a detailed proof would be presented in a forthcoming work, but such
a paper was not published after all.
The first detailed proof of the second incompleteness theorem was pre-
sented in the second volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik [10] by Hilbert and
Bernays. Especially they formulated a set of conditions for provability pred-
icates which is sufficient for the second incompleteness theorem. Let PrT (x)
be some Σ1 provability predicate of T . They proved that if PrT (x) satisfies
the following conditions HB1, HB2 and HB3, then the consistency statement
∀x(Fml(x) ∧ PrT (x)→ ¬PrT (¬˙x)) cannot be proved in T if T is consistent.
HB1 If T ` ϕ→ ψ, then T ` PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq).
HB2 T ` PrT (p¬ϕ(x)q)→ PrT (p¬ϕ(x˙)q).
HB3 T ` f(x) = 0→ PrT (pf(x˙) = 0q) for every primitive recursive term f(x).
Here pϕ(x˙)q is a primitive recursive term corresponding to a function calculating
the Go¨del number of the formula ϕ(n) from n, where n is the numeral for n.
These conditions are called the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions.
Lo¨b [17] proved that if PrT (x) satisfies the following conditions D1, D2 and
D3, then Lo¨b’s theorem holds, that is, for any formula ϕ, if T ` PrT (pϕq)→ ϕ,
then ϕ.
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D1 If T ` ϕ, then T ` PrT (pϕq).
D2 T ` PrT (pϕ→ ψq)→ (PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq)).
D3 T ` PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pPrT (pϕq)q).
Note that every provability predicate automatically satisfies D1. The con-
ditions D1 and D2 were established by Hilbert and Bernays, and the condition
D3 was introduced by Lo¨b. The conditions D1, D2 and D3 are nowadays called
the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions which are well-known as suffi-
cient conditions for a proof of the second incompleteness theorem. In fact, if T is
consistent, then the unprovability of the consistency statement ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q)
in T is an immediate corollary of Lo¨b’s theorem. The Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b
derivability conditions together with Lo¨b’s theorem are basis for modal logical
investigations of provability predicates (see [2, 5, 12, 21]).
Other sufficient conditions for the second incompleteness theorem were for-
mulated by authors such as Jeroslow, Montagna and Buchholz. Jeroslow [13]
proved that the following condition which is a variant of D3 implies the un-
provability of ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ PrT (x)→ ¬PrT (¬˙x)).
• T ` PrT (t)→ PrT (pPrT (t)q) for every primitive recursive term t.
Notice that D3 and Jeroslow’s condition are instances of the following provable
Σ1-completeness because PrT (x) is Σ1.
Σ1C If ϕ is a Σ1 sentence, then T ` ϕ→ PrT (pϕq).
Montagna [18] proved that the following two conditions are sufficient for
Lo¨b’s theorem.
• T ` ∀x(“x is a logical axiom” → PrT (x)).
• T ` ∀x∀y(Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y)→ (PrT (x→˙y)→ (PrT (x)→ PrT (y)))).
By Montagna’s argument, we can conclude that these two conditions imply the
unprovability of ∃x(Fml(x) ∧ ¬PrT (x)).
At last, in Buchholz’s lecture note [6], the following condition was introduced
and it was proved that this condition implies D2 and Σ1C.
• For all m ≥ 1,
if T ` ∀~x(ϕ1(~x)→ (ϕ2(~x)→ (· · · → (ϕm−1(~x)→ ϕm(~x)) · · · ))),
then T ` ∀~x(PrT (pϕ1(~˙x)q)→ (PrT (pϕ2(~˙x)q)→
(· · · → (PrT (pϕm−1(~˙x)q)→ PrT (pϕm(~˙x)q)) · · · ))).
Thus Buchholz’s condition implies the unprovability of ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q).
Roughly speaking, every set of derivability conditions introduced above is
sufficient for unprovability of consistency statements, but such a rough under-
standing does not allow us to grasp the situation of the second incompleteness
theorem accurately. Strictly speaking, these sets of sufficient conditions do not
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induce the same consequence because there are three different consistency state-
ments ConH ≡ ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ PrT (x) → ¬PrT (¬˙x)), ConL ≡ ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q) and
ConG ≡ ∃x(Fml(x)∧¬PrT (x)) in our context, and each of these sets of conditions
implies the unprovability of one of these consistency statements. Here super-
scripts ‘H’, ‘L’ and ‘G’ stand for Hilbert-Bernays, Lo¨b and Go¨del, respectively.
It is easy to see that ConH implies ConL, and ConL implies ConG. However the
converse implications do not hold in general.
In order to clarify the situation of several versions of derivability conditions,
in this paper, we investigate relationships between the conditions. The following
figure shows the situation for implications between prominent sets of conditions
for Σ1 formulas satisfying D1.
0 ConG 0 ConΣ1 0 ConL 0 ConH
B2,D3 Σ1C PC B2,CB,∆0C
U
D2,D3 B2,Σ1C
D2,Σ1C BU2
D1U,D2U
D1U,D2G,Σ1C
G
D2G,Σ1C
G
D2G,PCG
In Section 2, we introduce and investigate versions of derivability conditions.
Each of these conditions is classified as one of three versions of derivability con-
ditions, namely, local version, uniform version and global version. Among other
things, we show that each of two new sets {D1,B2,D3} and {D1,PC} of deriv-
ability conditions is sufficient for the unprovability of the consistency statement
ConH (see the next section for precise definitions of these conditions). Then
currently we know that four sets {B2,CB,∆0CU}, {D1,B2,D3}, {D1,Σ1C}
and {D1,PC} are sufficient for T 0 ConH , the set {D1,D2,D3} (Lo¨b’s condi-
tions) is sufficient for T 0 ConL, and the set {D1,D2G,PCG} is sufficient for
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T 0 ConG. Here {B2,CB,∆0CU}, {D1,Σ1C} and {D1,D2G,PCG} corre-
spond to Hilbert and Bernays’ conditions, Jeroslow’s conditions and Montagna’s
conditions, respectively.
In Section 3, we improve Buchholz’s proof of provable Σ1-completeness Σ1C.
More precisely, we prove that if PrT (x) satisfies the following condition B
U
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which is precisely the m = 2 case of Buchholz’s condition, then the uniform
version of Σ1C holds.
BU2 If T ` ∀~x (ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)), then T ` ∀~x(PrT (pϕ(~˙x)q)→ PrT (pψ(~˙x)q)).
In Section 4, we give some examples of formulas, and from these examples,
several non-implications between conditions are obtained. For instance, from
our examples, we obtain that {B2,CB,∆0CU}, {D1,B2,D3}, {D1,Σ1C}
and {D1,PC} are pairwise incomparable, and each of them is not sufficient
for T 0 ConL. Also we obtain that {D1,D2,D3} is not compatible with
each of {B2,CB,∆0CU}, {D1,B2,D3}, {D1,Σ1C} and {D1,PC}, and it
is not sufficient for T 0 ConG. Furthermore, we show that even stronger set
{D1U,D2G,Σ1CG} is not sufficient for T 0 ConG. From the last observation,
we can say that both of the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions and the
Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions do not accomplish Go¨del’s original
statement of the second incompleteness theorem.
2 Derivability conditions
Throughout this paper, S and T denote recursively axiomatized consistent ex-
tensions of Peano Arithmetic PA in the language of first-order arithmetic. The
theory S is intended as a metatheory, and we assume that T is an extension of
S. Let LA be the language of arithmetic including {0, s,+,×}, and we can freely
use terms corresponding to some primitive recursive functions. The numeral for
a natural number n is denoted by n. We fix some natural Go¨del numbering,
and for each LA-formula ϕ, let pϕq be the numeral for the Go¨del number of ϕ.
Let x→˙y and ¬˙x denote primitive recursive terms such that for any formulas ϕ
and ψ, PA ` pϕq→˙pψq = pϕ→ ψq and PA ` ¬pϕq = p¬ϕq.
Let ∆0 = Σ0 = Π0 be the set of all formulas whose quantifiers are all
bounded. Let Σn+1 and Πn+1 (n ≥ 0) be the least sets of formulas satisfying
the following conditions:
1. Σn ∪Πn ⊆ Σn+1 ∩Πn+1;
2. Σn+1 (resp. Πn+1) is closed under conjunction, disjunction, bounded quan-
tification, and existential (universal) quantification;
3. If ϕ is in Σn+1 (resp. Πn+1), then ¬ϕ is in Πn+1 (resp. Σn+1);
4. If ϕ is in Σn+1 (resp. Πn+1) and ψ is in Πn+1 (resp. Σn+1), then ϕ → ψ
is in Πn+1 (resp. Σn+1).
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Throughout this paper, Γ denotes Σn or Πn for some n ≥ 0. We say a formula
ϕ is Γ if ϕ ∈ Γ. A formula ϕ is said to be ∆1 if it is provably equivalent to
both some Σ1 formula and some Π1 formula in PA. Let Fml(x), Sent(x) and
Σz(x) be ∆1 formulas saying that “x is the Go¨del number of an LA-formula”,
“x is the Go¨del number of an LA-sentence” and “x is the Go¨del number of a Σz
formula”, respectively. We assume that PA can derive natural facts about these
formulas such as ∀z∃x > zFml(x).
We say a formula Pr(x) is a provability predicate of a theory U (in PA) if it
weakly represents the set of all theorems of U in PA, that is, for any natural
number n, PA ` Pr(n) if and only if n is the Go¨del number of some theorem
of U . Also we say a formula τ(v) is a numeration of U (in PA) if it weakly
represents the set of all axioms of U in PA, that is, for any natural number
n, PA ` τ(n) if and only if n is the Go¨del number of some axiom of U . For
each numeration τ(v) of U , we can naturally construct a formula Prfτ (x, y)
saying that “y is the code of a proof of a formula with the Go¨del number x from
the set of all sentences satisfying τ(v)” (see Feferman [7]). We may assume
PA ` ∀x∀y(Prfτ (x, y) → x ≤ y). If τ(v) is a Σn numeration of U , then the
formula Prτ (x) :≡ ∃yPrfτ (x, y) is a Σn provability predicate of U . If it is not
necessary to specify a particular numeration of U , PrfU (x, y) and PrU (x) denote
Prfτ (x, y) and Prτ (x) for some fixed numeration τ(v) of U , respectively.
For each finitely axiomatized theory T0, let [T0](x) be the formula
∨
ϕ∈T0(x =
pϕq). Then [T0](x) is a numeration of T0. Let
∧
T0 be the conjunction of all
axioms of T0, and let Pr∅(x) be a natural provability predicate of first-order
predicate calculus. Then the following lemma holds (see Feferman [7]).
Lemma 2.1 (Formalized deduction theorem). For any finitely axiomatized the-
ory T0, PA ` ∀x(Pr[T0](x)↔ Pr∅(p
∧
T0q→˙x)).
Throughout this paper, the formula Φ(x) is intended to denote some prov-
ability predicate of T . However, we deal with more general situations, that is,
Φ(x) may not be any provability predicate of T . In this section, we introduce
a lot of conditions for Φ(x) which are satisfied by naturally constructed prov-
ability predicates PrT (x). The remainder of this section is separated into three
subsections, and in each of these subsections, we introduce local derivability
conditions, uniform derivability conditions and global derivability conditions,
respectively.
For each formula Φ(x), we define four kinds of consistency statements based
on Φ(x).
Definition 2.2.
1. ConHΦ :≡ ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ Φ(x)→ ¬Φ(¬˙x)).
2. ConLΦ :≡ ¬Φ(p0 6= 0q).
3. ConGΦ :≡ ∃x(Fml(x) ∧ ¬Φ(x)).
4. ConΣ1Φ :≡ ∃x(Σ1(x) ∧ Sent(x) ∧ ¬Φ(x)).
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The first consistency statement ConHΦ is adopted in Hilbert and Bernays [10]
and Feferman [7]. The second sentence ConLΦ is the most tractable one, and it
is widely used in the context of modal logical investigations of provability pred-
icates. Go¨del [8] stated his second incompleteness theorem with the consistency
statement ConGΦ . The last consistency statement Con
Σ1
Φ states that there exists
a T -unprovable Σ1 sentence.
2.1 Local derivability conditions
We introduce the weakest version of derivability conditions which are called
local derivability conditions.
Definition 2.3 (Local derivability conditions).
D1 If T ` ϕ, then S ` Φ(pϕq) for any formula ϕ.
D2 S ` Φ(pϕ→ ψq)→ (Φ(pϕq)→ Φ(pψq)) for any formulas ϕ and ψ.
D3 S ` Φ(pϕq)→ Φ(pΦ(pϕq)q) for any formula ϕ.
ΓC S ` ϕ→ Φ(pϕq) for any Γ sentence ϕ.
Bm (m ≥ 1) If T `
∧
0<i<m
ϕi → ϕm, then S `
∧
0<i<m
Φ(pϕiq) → Φ(pϕmq) for
any formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕm.
PC S ` Pr∅(pϕq)→ Φ(pϕq) for any formula ϕ.
The condition D1 is automatically satisfied by all provability predicates of
T . The conditions D2, D3 and Σ1C were introduced by Hilbert and Bernays
[10], Lo¨b [17] and Feferman [7], respectively. It is known that natural provability
predicates PrT (x) satisfy full local derivability conditions. In particular, Fefer-
man proved Σ1C for the provability predicate PrQ(x) of Robinson’s arithmetic
Q (cf. [22]). The conditions Bm (m ≥ 1) were introduced by Buchholz [6]. The
condition B1 is precisely D1, and the condition B2 is precisely the condition
HB1 described in the introduction. The condition B2 was also discussed by
Montagna [18] and Visser [23]. The last condition PC says that Φ(x) contains
predicate calculus.
We prove the basic implications between local derivability conditions. For
example, the first clause of the following proposition says that if a formula Φ(x)
satisfies D1, then it also satisfies ∆0C.
Proposition 2.4.
1. D1⇒∆0C.
2. ∆0C and Bm for some m ≥ 1⇒ D1.
3. B3 ⇒ D2.
4. The following are equivalent:
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(a) D1 and D2.
(b) Bm for all m ≥ 1.
(c) D1 and Bm for some m ≥ 3.
(d) ∆0C and Bm for some m ≥ 3.
5. If Φ(x) is a Γ formula, then ΓC⇒ D3.
6. B2 and PC ⇐⇒ B2 and Σ1C.
7. B2 and PC⇒ D1.
8. D1, D2 and PC ⇐⇒ D1, D2 and Σ1C.
Proof. 1. Suppose Φ(x) satisfies D1. Let ϕ be any ∆0 sentence. Then ϕ is
decidable in PA. If PA ` ϕ, then S ` Φ(pϕq) by D1, and hence S ` ϕ→ Φ(pϕq).
If PA ` ¬ϕ, then S ` ϕ→ Φ(pϕq).
2. Suppose Φ(x) satisfies ∆0C and Bm for some m ≥ 1. Let ϕ be any
formula with T ` ϕ. Then T ` 0 = 0 ∧ · · · ∧ 0 = 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
→ ϕ. By Bm, we have
S ` Φ(p0 = 0q) → Φ(pϕq). By ∆0C, S ` 0 = 0 → Φ(p0 = 0q), and hence
S ` Φ(p0 = 0q). We conclude S ` Φ(pϕq).
3. Since T ` (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ϕ → ψ, we obtain S ` Φ(pϕ → ψq) ∧ Φ(pϕq) →
Φ(pψq) by B3.
4. (a) ⇒ (b) is well-known in the context of modal logic. (b) ⇒ (c) is
trivial. (c) ⇔ (d) follows from clauses 1 and 2. We prove (c) ⇒ (a): Suppose
Φ(x) satisfies D1 and Bm for some m ≥ 3. By clause 3, it suffices to prove
that Φ(x) satisfies B3. Suppose T ` ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 → ϕ3. Then T ` ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧
0 = 0 ∧ · · · ∧ 0 = 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−3
→ ϕ3. By Bm, we obtain S ` Φ(pϕ1q) ∧ Φ(pϕ2q) ∧ Φ(p0 =
0q) → Φ(pϕ3q). By D1, we have S ` Φ(p0 = 0q). Hence S ` Φ(pϕ1q) ∧
Φ(pϕ2q)→ Φ(pϕ3q).
5. Trivial.
6. (⇒): Assume that Φ(x) satisfies B2 and PC. Let ϕ be any Σ1 sentence.
Let T0 be some finite subtheory of T containing Robinson’s arithmetic Q. By
PC, S ` Pr∅(p
∧
T0 → ϕq) → Φ(p
∧
T0 → ϕq). Here Pr∅(p
∧
T0 → ϕq) is
equivalent to Pr[T0](pϕq) by formalized deduction theorem (Lemma 2.1), and
therefore we obtain S ` Pr[T0](pϕq)→ Φ(p
∧
T0 → ϕq). Since T0 is a subtheory
of T , we have T ` (∧T0 → ϕ) → ϕ. By B2, S ` Φ(p∧T0 → ϕq) → Φ(pϕq).
Thus we obtain S ` Pr[T0](pϕq)→ Φ(pϕq). Since T0 contains Q, Σ1C holds for
Pr[T0](x), and hence S ` ϕ→ Pr[T0](pϕq). Therefore S ` ϕ→ Φ(pϕq).
(⇐): Suppose Φ(x) satisfies B2 and Σ1C. Let ϕ be any formula. Since
Pr∅(pϕq) is a Σ1 sentence, S ` Pr∅(pϕq) → Φ(pPr∅(pϕq)q). Since T is an
extension of PA, T ` Pr∅(pϕq) → ϕ by the reflexiveness of PA (see [16]). By
B2, S ` Φ(pPr∅(pϕq)q)→ Φ(pϕq). Therefore S ` Pr∅(pϕq)→ Φ(pϕq).
7. This follows from clauses 2 and 6.
8. This equivalence follows from clauses 4 and 6.
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Before describing several versions of the second incompleteness theorem, we
prepare two propositions.
Proposition 2.5.
1. If Φ(x) satisfies D1, then S ` ConHΦ → ConLΦ.
2. PA ` ConLΦ → ConΣ1Φ .
3. PA ` ConΣ1Φ → ConGΦ .
Proof. 1. Suppose Φ(x) satisfies D1, Then S ` Φ(p0 = 0q). Since PA ` ConHΦ →
(Φ(p0 = 0q)→ ¬Φ(p0 6= 0q)), we have S ` ConHΦ → ConLΦ.
Clauses 2 and 3 are obvious.
The following proposition is a part of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem.
Proposition 2.6. Let ϕ be a sentence satisfying PA ` ϕ ↔ ¬Φ(pϕq). If Φ(x)
satisfies D1, then T 0 ϕ.
Proof. Suppose Φ(x) satisfies D1. If T ` ϕ, then by D1, S ` Φ(pϕq). By the
choice of ϕ, S ` ¬ϕ. This contradicts the consistency of T because T is an
extension of S. Therefore T 0 ϕ.
It is well-known that for proofs of the second incompleteness theorem, the
Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions D1, D2 and D3 are sufficient. This
is essentially due to Lo¨b (see [5, 16]).
Theorem 2.7 (Lo¨b [17]). If Φ(x) satisfies D1, D2 and D3, then T 0 ConLΦ.
Notice that {D1,B2,D3} is weaker than {D1,D2,D3} by Proposition
2.4.4. For the former conditions, we obtain another version of the second in-
completeness theorem.
Theorem 2.8. If Φ(x) satisfies D1, B2 and D3, then T 0 ConHΦ .
Proof. Suppose Φ(x) satisfies D1, B2 and D3. Let ϕ be a sentence satisfying
PA ` ϕ↔ ¬Φ(pϕq). The existence of such a sentence ϕ follows from the Fixed
Point Lemma (see [16]). Since T ` Φ(pϕq)→ ¬ϕ, we have S ` Φ(pΦ(pϕq)q)→
Φ(p¬ϕq) by B2. By D3, S ` Φ(pϕq) → Φ(pΦ(pϕq)q). Thus S ` Φ(pϕq) →
Φ(p¬ϕq), and hence S ` ¬ϕ → ∃x(Fml(x) ∧ Φ(x) ∧ Φ(¬˙x)). It follows S `
ConHΦ → ϕ. By Proposition 2.6, T 0 ϕ, and thus T 0 ConHΦ .
Jeroslow [13] proved that if LA contains sufficiently many primitive recursive
terms and if Φ(x) satisfies D1 and S ` Φ(t)→ Φ(pΦ(t)q) for all primitive recur-
sive terms t, then T 0 ConHΦ . That is to say, in Theorem 2.8, if we strengthen
the condition D3 in this way, then the condition B2 can be omitted. As a con-
sequence, if Φ(x) is a Γ formula, then the conditions D1 and ΓC are sufficient
for the unprovability of ConHΦ in Jersolow’s setting of language. We show that
this is also the case without using such sufficiently many primitive recursive
terms.
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Theorem 2.9 (Jeroslow [13]). If Φ(x) is a Γ formula satisfying D1 and ΓC,
then T 0 ConHΦ .
Proof. Let ϕ be a Γ sentence such that PA ` ϕ↔ Φ(p¬ϕq). By Proposition 2.6,
T 0 ¬ϕ because of D1. By ΓC and the choice of ϕ, S ` ϕ→ Φ(pϕq)∧Φ(p¬ϕq).
Then we have S ` ϕ→ ¬ConHΦ . Therefore T 0 ConHΦ .
By Proposition 2.4.8 and Theorem 2.7, if Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying
D1, D2 and PC, then T 0 ConLΦ. Also by Proposition 2.4.6 and Theorem 2.9,
if Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying D1, B2 and PC, then T 0 ConHΦ . We improve
the latter statement as follows.
Theorem 2.10. If Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying D1 and PC, then T 0 ConHΦ .
Proof. Suppose that Φ(x) is Σ1 and satisfies D1 and PC. Let T0 be a finite
subtheory of T containing Q. Let ϕ be a Σ1 sentence satisfying PA ` ϕ ↔
Φ(p¬(∧T0 → ϕ)q). By PC and formalized deduction theorem, we have S `
Pr[T0](pϕq)→ Φ(p
∧
T0 → ϕq). By Σ1C for Pr[T0](x), S ` ϕ→ Φ(p
∧
T0 → ϕq).
Since PA ` ϕ → Φ(p¬(∧T0 → ϕ)q) by the choice of ϕ, we obtain S ` ϕ →
¬ConHΦ .
If T ` ConHΦ , then T ` ¬ϕ. Also T `
∧
T0 ∧ ¬ϕ, and this means T `
¬(∧T0 → ϕ). By D1, S ` Φ(p¬(∧T0 → ϕ)q), and hence S ` ϕ. This is a
contradiction. Therefore T 0 ConHΦ .
Remark 2.11. The following makeshift condition Σ1C
− is of course weaker
than Σ1C if
∧ ∅ → ϕ is identical to ϕ.
Σ1C
− There exists a finite subtheory T0 of T such that for any Σ1 sentence ϕ,
S ` ϕ→ Φ(p∧T0 → ϕq).
Our proof of Proposition 2.4.6 (⇒) actually shows two implications “PC ⇒
Σ1C
−” and “{B2,Σ1C−} ⇒ Σ1C”. Also our proof of Theorem 2.10 essentially
shows that if Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying D1 and Σ1C
−, then T 0 ConHΦ .
Then Theorems 2.9 and 2.10 directly follow from these observations.
In this section, we have seen that {D1,D2,D3} is sufficient for T 0 ConLΦ
(Theorem 2.7), and {D1,B2,D3} is sufficient for T 0 ConHΦ (Theorem 2.8).
Also for Σ1 formulas Φ(x), each of {D1,Σ1C} and {D1,PC} is sufficient for
T 0 ConHΦ (Theorems 2.9 and 2.10). From examples of formulas given in Section
4, the following non-implications are obtained. These non-implications show
that these unprovability results are optimal. For example, the third clause in
the following list means that there exists a Σ1 formula Φ(x) satisfying both D1
and D2 such that T ` ConHΦ .
• {D1,D2,Σ1C} 6⇒ T 0 ConHΦ (Fact 4.3).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D2,D3,Σ1C,PC} 6⇒ T 0 ConHΦ (Proposition 4.1).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,D2} 6⇒ T 0 ConHΦ (Fact 4.5.1).
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• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,D3} 6⇒ T 0 ConHΦ (Fact 4.5.2).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,B2,D3} 6⇒ T 0 ConLΦ (Fact 4.6.3).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,Σ1C,PC} 6⇒ T 0 ConLΦ (Proposition 4.4).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,D2,Σ1C} 6⇒ T 0 ConΣ1Φ (Proposition 4.10).
These non-implications show that none of {D1,B2,D3}, {D1,Σ1C} and
{D1,PC} implies {D1,D2,D3}. Moreover we obtain the following non-implications.
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,D2,D3} 6⇒ Σ1C (Proposition 4.12). By Proposition 2.4.6,
this is equivalent to {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,D2,D3} 6⇒ PC.
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,Σ1C,PC} 6⇒ B2 (Proposition 4.4).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,Σ1C} 6⇒ PC (Proposition 4.13).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,PC} 6⇒ Σ1C (Proposition 4.14).
Consequently, {D1,B2,D3}, {D1,Σ1C} and {D1,PC} are pairwise incom-
parable. Also {D1,D2,D3} is incomparable with each of {D1,Σ1C} and
{D1,PC}.
2.2 Uniform derivability conditions
In this subsection, we introduce and investigate uniform derivability conditions.
Let ϕ(~x) be an abbreviation for ϕ(x0, . . . , xk) for some k.
Definition 2.12 (Uniform derivability conditions).
D1U If T ` ∀~xϕ(~x), then S ` ∀~xΦ(pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
D2U S ` ∀~x (Φ(pϕ(~˙x) → ψ(~˙x)q) → (Φ(pϕ(~˙x)q) → Φ(pψ(~˙x)q))) for any formu-
las ϕ(~x) and ψ(~x).
D3U S ` ∀~x (Φ(pϕ(~˙x)q)→ Φ(pΦ(pϕ(~˙x)q)q)) for any formula ϕ(~x).
ΓCU S ` ∀~x (ϕ(~x)→ Φ(pϕ(~˙x)q)) for any Γ formula ϕ(~x).
BUm (m ≥ 1) If T ` ∀~x
( ∧
0<i<m
ϕi(~x)→ ϕm(~x)
)
,
then S ` ∀~x
( ∧
0<i<m
Φ(pϕi(~˙x)q)→ Φ(pϕm(~˙x)q)
)
for any formulas ϕ1(~x), . . . , ϕm(~x).
CB S ` Φ(p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xΦ(pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
PCU S ` ∀~x(Pr∅(pϕ(~˙x)q)→ Φ(pϕ(~˙x)q)) for any formula ϕ(~x).
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Usual proofs of the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions D1, D2 and
D3 (in books such as [5]) are demonstrated by showing stronger uniform deriv-
ability conditions D1U, D2U and Σ1C
U. Notice that the natural provability
predicates PrT (x) satisfy full uniform derivability conditions.
As in the local version, the conditions BUm (m ≥ 1) were introduced by
Buchholz [6], and BU1 is precisely D1
U. The condition CB claims that sentences
corresponding to the Converse Barcan Formula investigated in predicate modal
logic (see [11]) are provable. Notice that the condition HB2 described in the
introduction seems to be a variant of the condition CB. It is easy to see that
each of uniform derivability conditions is stronger than the corresponding local
version. Moreover, uniform derivability conditions are strictly stronger than
local derivability conditions (see Proposition 4.9 in Section 4).
As in the local version, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.13.
1. ∆0C and B
U
m for some m ≥ 1⇒ D1U.
2. BU3 ⇒ D2U.
3. The following are equivalent:
(a) D1U and D2U.
(b) BUm for all m ≥ 1.
(c) D1U and BUm for some m ≥ 3.
4. If Φ(x) is a Γ formula, then ΓCU ⇒ D3U.
5. BU2 and PC
U ⇐⇒ BU2 and Σ1CU.
6. BU2 and PC
U ⇒ D1U.
7. D1U, D2U and PCU ⇐⇒ D1U, D2U and Σ1CU.
The condition CB is related to other conditions.
Proposition 2.14.
1. D1 and CB⇒ D1U.
2. BU2 ⇒ CB.
3. D2U and PCU ⇒ CB.
4. The following are equivalent:
(a) D1U and D2U.
(b) D1, BU2 and D2
U.
(c) D1, CB and D2U.
11
Proof. 1. Suppose that Φ(x) satisfies D1 and CB. Assume T ` ∀~xϕ(~x). Then
S ` Φ(p∀~xϕ(~x)q) by D1. Since S ` Φ(p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xΦ(pϕ(~˙x)q) by CB, we
have S ` ∀~xΦ(pϕ(~˙x)q).
2. Suppose that Φ(x) satisfies BU2 . Since T ` ∀~xϕ(~x) → ϕ(~x), we have
S ` Φ(p∀~xϕ(~x)q) → Φ(pϕ(~˙x)q) by BU2 . Therefore S ` Φ(p∀~xϕ(~x)q) →
∀~xΦ(pϕ(~˙x)q).
3. Suppose Φ(x) satisfies D2U and PCU. Let ϕ(~x) be any formula. Since
∀~xϕ(~x) → ϕ(~x) is provable in predicate calculus, S ` Pr∅(p∀~xϕ(~x) → ϕ(~˙x)q)
by D1U for Pr∅(x). From PCU, S ` Φ(p∀~xϕ(~x) → ϕ(~˙x)q). Then by D2U,
S ` Φ(p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ Φ(pϕ(~˙x)q). Thus S ` Φ(p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xΦ(pϕ(~˙x)q).
4. The implications (a)⇒ (b), (b)⇒ (c) and (c)⇒ (a) follow from Proposi-
tion 2.13.3, clause 2 and clause 1, respectively.
The following corollary immediately follows from clauses 1 and 3 of Propo-
sition 2.14.
Corollary 2.15. D1, D2U and PCU ⇒ D1U.
Hilbert and Bernays [10] proved that if a Σ1 formula Φ(x) satisfies the con-
ditions HB1, HB2 and HB3 described in the introduction, then T 0 ConHΦ . In
our framework, the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions can be replaced by
the conditions B2, CB and ∆0C
U without any substantial change. Then we
obtain the following version of the second incompleteness theorem.
Theorem 2.16 (Hilbert and Bernays [10]). If Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying
B2, CB and ∆0C
U, then T 0 ConHΦ .
Proof. Suppose that Φ(x) is Σ1 and satisfies B2, CB and ∆0C
U. Let ϕ be
a Π1 sentence satisfying PA ` ϕ ↔ ¬Φ(pϕq). Let δ(x) be a ∆0 formula with
PA ` ϕ ↔ ∀xδ(x). Then by B2, S ` Φ(pϕq) → Φ(p∀xδ(x)q). By CB, we
obtain
S ` ¬ϕ→ ∀xΦ(pδ(x˙)q). (1)
On the other hand, S ` ¬δ(x) → Φ(p¬δ(x˙)q) by ∆0CU. Then S `
∃x¬δ(x) → ∃xΦ(p¬δ(x˙)q). Hence S ` ¬ϕ → ∃xΦ(p¬δ(x˙)q). By combining
this with (1), we obtain
S ` ¬ϕ→ ∃x(Φ(pδ(x˙)q) ∧ Φ(p¬δ(x˙)q)).
It follows S ` ¬ϕ→ ∃x(Fml(x)∧Φ(x)∧Φ(¬˙x)), and hence S ` ConHΦ → ϕ. By
Proposition 2.4.2, Φ(x) satisfies D1. Then by Proposition 2.6, T 0 ϕ. Therefore
we conclude T 0 ConHΦ .
Theorem 2.16 is optimal in the sense of the following non-implications from
Section 4.
• {D1,B2,CB,∆0CU} 6⇒ T 0 ConHΦ (Fact 4.3).
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• {Φ ∈ Σ1,CB,∆0CU} 6⇒ T 0 ConHΦ (Proposition 4.1).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,B2,CB} 6⇒ T 0 ConHΦ (Proposition 4.2).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,B2,∆0CU} 6⇒ T 0 ConHΦ (Fact 4.6.1).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,B2,CB,∆0CU} 6⇒ T 0 ConLΦ (Fact 4.6.2).
Notice that {B2,CB,∆0CU} is equivalent to {D1,B2,CB,∆0CU} by Propo-
sition 2.4.2. For the latter condition, we do not know if {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,B2,CB,∆0CU}
is optimal to conclude T 0 ConHΦ or not.
Problem 2.17.
1. Is there a Σ1 provability predicate satisfying D1, CB and ∆0C
U such
that T ` ConHΦ ?
2. Is there a Σ1 provability predicate satisfying D1, B2 and CB such that
T ` ConHΦ ?
The following two non-implications from Section 4 indicate that {B2,CB,∆0CU}
is incomparable with each of {D1,D2,D3}, {D1,B2,D3}, {D1,Σ1C} and
{D1,PC}.
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,B2,CB,∆0CU} 6⇒ D3 (Fact 4.6.2).
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1,D2,Σ1C} 6⇒ CB (Proposition 4.9).
Usual proof of Σ1C
U (in books such as [5]) proceeds by induction on the
construction of Σ1 formulas, and it requires much effort. In the lecture note [6]
by Buchholz, an elegant schematic proof of Σ1C
U is presented. More precisely,
it is proved that for a proof of Σ1C
U, the assumption “BUm for all m ≥ 1” is
sufficient. By Proposition 2.13.3, this assumption is equivalent to {D1U,D2U}.
Hence Buchholz’s work is stated as follows.
Theorem 2.18 (Buchholz [6]). D1U and D2U ⇒ Σ1CU.
In Rautenberg’s book [20], a schematic proof of Σ1C
U based on Buchholz’s
argument is presented. As a corollary to Theorem 2.18, we obtain the following
version of the second incompleteness theorem.
Corollary 2.19. If Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying D1
U and D2U, then T 0
ConLΦ.
Notice that {D1U,D2U} implies {D1,BU2 } by Proposition 2.13.3. The
following theorem improves Buchholz’s Theorem 2.18 which will be proved in
the next section.
Theorem 2.20. D1 and BU2 ⇒ Σ1CU.
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This theorem says that only the m = 1, 2 cases of Buchholz’s assumption
are sufficient to prove Σ1C
U. We will also prove that Theorem 2.20 is actu-
ally an improvement of Theorem 2.18 (see Theorem 4.15 below). Interestingly,
for Σ1 formulas, {D1,BU2 } implies {D1,B2,D3}, {D1,Σ1C}, {D1,PC} and
{B2,CB,∆0CU} by Theorem 2.20 and Proposition 2.13, and each of them is
sufficient for T 0 ConHΦ . As a consequence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.21. If Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying D1 and B
U
2 , then T 0
ConHΦ .
Related to Corollary 2.21, we propose the following problem.
Problem 2.22. Is there a Σ1 formula Φ(x) satisfying D1 and B
U
2 such that
T ` ConLΦ?
In contrast to the consistency statements ConHΦ and Con
L
Φ, Proposition 4.10
in Section 4 shows that the full uniform derivability conditions are not sufficient
for the unprovability of ConΣ1Φ and Con
G
Φ .
From Theorem 2.20 and Proposition 2.13.5, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.23. D1 and BU2 ⇒ PCU.
Moreover, we show that D1 and BU2 imply a stronger version of PC
U. For
n ≥ 0, let TrueΣn(x) be a natural formula saying that “x is a true Σn sentence”
(cf. Ha´jek and Pudla´k [9]).
Proposition 2.24. If Φ(x) satisfies D1 and BU2 , then for n ≥ 0,
S ` ∀x(Σn(x) ∧ Pr∅(x)→ Φ(pTrueΣn(x˙)q)).
Proof. Suppose that Φ(x) satisfies D1 and BU2 , and let n ≥ 0. By Theorem 2.20,
Φ(x) satisfies Σ1C
U, and hence S ` Σn(x) ∧ Pr∅(x) → Φ(pΣn(x˙) ∧ Pr∅(x˙)q).
By reflexiveness, T ` Σn(x) ∧ Pr∅(x) → TrueΣn(x). Then S ` Φ(pΣn(x˙) ∧
Pr∅(x˙)q) → Φ(pTrueΣn(x˙)q) by BU2 . We conclude S ` Σn(x) ∧ Pr∅(x) →
Φ(pTrueΣn(x˙)q).
2.3 Global derivability conditions
At last, we introduce the strongest version of derivability conditions. They are
called global derivability conditions.
Definition 2.25 (Global derivability conditions).
D2G PA ` ∀x∀y(Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y)→ (Φ(x→˙y)→ (Φ(x)→ Φ(y)))).
D3G PA ` ∀x(Fml(x)→ (Φ(x)→ Φ(pΦ(x˙)q))).
ΓCG PA ` ∀x(TrueΓ(x)→ Φ(x)).
PCG PA ` ∀x(Fml(x)→ (Pr∅(x)→ Φ(x))).
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The condition D2G for provability predicates PrT (x) was proved in Feferman
[7]. Montagna [18] investigated the condition D2G. The condition Σ1C
G for
PrQ(x) is explicitly stated in the book [9]. Global derivability conditions are
strictly stronger than uniform derivability conditions (see Proposition 4.10).
We can prove the following proposition as in the uniform version.
Proposition 2.26.
1. If Φ(x) is a Γ formula, then ΓCU ⇒ D3G.
2. D1, D2G and PCG ⇒ Σ1CG.
Proposition 2.26.2 was stated in von Bu¨low [25] and Visser [24].
Consistency statements are enhanced by global derivability conditions.
Proposition 2.27.
1. If Φ(x) satisfies D2G and PCG, then S ` ConGΦ → ConHΦ .
2. If Φ(x) satisfies D1, D2G and PCG, then ConHΦ , Con
L
Φ and Con
G
Φ are
mutually equivalent in S.
3. If Φ(x) satisfies D2G and Σ1C
G, then ConLΦ and Con
Σ1
Φ are equivalent in
S.
Proof. 1. Suppose Φ(x) satisfies D2G and PCG. Since PA ` ∀x∀y(Fml(x) ∧
Fml(y) → Pr∅(x→˙(¬˙x→˙y))), S ` ∀x∀y(Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) → Φ(x→˙(¬˙x→˙y))) by
PCG. Hence ∀x∀y(Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) ∧ Φ(x) ∧ Φ(¬˙x) → Φ(y)) is provable in S
by D2G. This sentence is equivalent to ConGΦ → ConHΦ .
2. This follows from Proposition 2.5 and clause 1.
3. Suppose Φ(x) satisfies D2G and Σ1C
G. By Proposition 2.5, it suffices
to show S ` ConΣ1Φ → ConLΦ. Since PA ` ¬TrueΣ1(p0 6= 0q), PA ` Σ1(x) ∧
Sent(x) → TrueΣ1(p0 6= 0q→˙x). By Σ1CG, S ` Σ1(x) ∧ Sent(x) → Φ(p0 6=
0q→˙x). By D2G, S ` Σ1(x) ∧ Sent(x) → (Φ(p0 6= 0q) → Φ(x)). Thus S `
ConΣ1Φ → ConLΦ.
From Theorems 2.7 and 2.10, and Proposition 2.27, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.28.
1. If Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying D1, D2
G and PCG, then T 0 ConGΦ .
2. If Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying D1, D2
G and Σ1C
G, then T 0 ConΣ1Φ .
Corollary 2.28.2 and Proposition 2.13.7 show that {D1U,D2G,Σ1CG} is
weaker than {D1,D2G,PCG}. Moreover, Proposition 4.11 in Section 4 shows
the following interesting non-implication:
• {Φ ∈ Σ1,D1U,D2G,Σ1CG} 6⇒ T 0 ConGΦ .
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Hence in contrast to local and uniform versions, {D1U,D2G,Σ1CG} is strictly
weaker than {D1,D2G,PCG}. Also this non-implication indicates that global
derivability conditions except for PCG are not sufficient for the unprovability
of Go¨del’s consistency statement ConGΦ even if Φ is Σ1. This shows that both
of Hilbert-Bernays’ conditions and Lo¨b’s conditions do not accomplish Go¨del’s
original statement of the second incompleteness theorem.
Let LogAx(x) be a suitable ∆1 formula representing the set of all logical
axioms of predicate calculus formulated in Feferman’s paper [7]. In Feferman’s
formulation, the sole inference rule is modus ponens, and the generalization rule
is admissible (see Result 2.1 in [7]). The following condition was introduced by
Montagna [18].
Definition 2.29.
Ax S ` ∀x(LogAx(x)→ Φ(x)).
The condition Ax is related to the condition PCG.
Proposition 2.30.
1. PCG ⇒ Ax.
2. D2G and Ax⇒ PCG.
3. If Φ(x) satisfies D1, then for any sentence ϕ, S ` LogAx(pϕq)→ Φ(pϕq).
Proof. 1. This is because PA ` ∀x(LogAx(x)→ Pr∅(x)).
2. Let Pr′∅(x) be a natural provability predicate of the predicate calculus
formulated in Feferman’s framework. Then PA ` ∀x(Fml(x) → (Pr∅(x) →
Pr′∅(x))) holds by induction inside PA. Since S proves that Φ(x) contains axioms
of Pr′∅(x) by Ax and that Φ(x) is closed under the inference rule of Pr
′
∅(x) by
D2G, S proves ∀x(Fml(x) → (Pr′∅(x) → Φ(x))) by induction inside S. Hence
S ` ∀x(Fml(x)→ (Pr∅(x)→ Φ(x))) holds.
3. Let ϕ be any sentence. If ϕ is a logical axiom, then T ` ϕ. By D1,
S ` Φ(pϕq). If ϕ is not a logical axiom, then S ` ¬LogAx(pϕq). In either case,
we obtain S ` LogAx(pϕq)→ Φ(pϕq).
Montagna [18] proved that if Φ(x) satisfies D1, D2G and Ax, then D3 is
redundant for a proof of Lo¨b’s theorem. From Propositions 2.26 and 2.30, and
Corollary 2.28, we obtain the following improvement of Montagna’s result.
Corollary 2.31 (Montagna [18]).
1. D1, D2G and Ax⇒ D1U and Σ1CG.
2. If Φ(x) is a Σ1 formula satisfying D1, D2
G and Ax, then T 0 ConGΦ .
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3 Proof of Theorem 2.20
In this section, we prove Theorem 2.20, that is, we prove that if Φ(x) satisfies
D1 and BU2 , then Φ(x) satisfies Σ1C
U.
For any formula ϕ(v), term t(~x), numbers ~n and variable v, the result of
substituting t(~n) for v in ϕ(v) is equal to the result of substituting ~n for x
in ϕ(t(x)). This observation can be formalized in PA, and hence the result of
substituting t(~x) for v in Φ(pϕ(v˙)q) is provably equivalent to Φ(pϕ(t(~˙x))q).
Notice that each atomic formula t0 = t1 is equivalent to ∃z(z = t0 ∧ z = t1),
and each negated atomic formula t0 6= t1 is PA-equivalent to ∃z0∃z1(t0 + s(z0) =
t1 ∨ t1 + s(z1) = t0). Then we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For any quantifier-free formula ξ(~x), there exists a quantifier-free
formula δ(~x, ~y) satisfying the following conditions:
1. PA ` ∀~x(ξ(~x)↔ ∃~yδ(~x, ~y)).
2. δ(~x, ~y) is of the form δ0(~x, ~y) ∨ · · · ∨ δk(~x, ~y) and each disjunct δi(~x, ~y) is
of the form∧
j≤li
(zi,j = ti,j(~x, ~y))
for some terms ti,0(~x, ~y), . . . , ti,li(~x, ~y) and variables zi,0, . . . , zi,li ∈ ~x, ~y.
Also in our proof of Theorem 2.20, we use the following PA-provable form of
the MRDP theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (The MRDP theorem (see [14])). For any Σ1 formula ϕ(~x), there
exists a quantifier-free formula δ(~x, ~y) such that PA ` ∀~x(ϕ(~x)↔ ∃~yδ(~x, ~y)).
Proof of Theorem 2.20. Suppose that Φ(x) satisfies D1 and BU2 . Then Φ(x)
also satisfies D1U by Propositions 2.4.1 and 2.13.1.
Let σ(~x) be any Σ1 formula. We would like to prove S ` ∀~x(σ(~x) →
Φ(pσ(~˙x)q)). By the MRDP theorem (Theorem 3.2), there exists a quantifier-
free formula δ(~x, ~y) such that PA ` ∀~x(σ(~x) ↔ ∃~yδ(~x, ~y)). By Lemma 3.1, we
may assume that δ(~x, ~y) is of the form indicated in the statement of Lemma 3.1.
Since
PA ` ∀zi,0 · · · ∀zi,li
∧
j≤li
(zi,j = zi,j)
 ,
we have
S ` ∀zi,0 · · · ∀zi,liΦ
p∧
j≤li
(z˙i,j = z˙i,j)q
 (2)
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by D1U. Let u0, . . . , uli , v0, . . . , vli be fresh variables. By equality axioms of
predicate calculus, we have
PA `
∧
j≤li
(zi,j = uj)→
Φ
p∧
j≤li
(v˙j = z˙i,j)q
→ Φ
p∧
j≤li
(v˙j = u˙j)q
 .
By substituting zi,j for vj , we obtain
PA `
∧
j≤li
(zi,j = uj)→
Φ
p∧
j≤li
(z˙i,j = z˙i,j)q
→ Φ
p∧
j≤li
(z˙i,j = u˙j)q
 .
By combining this with (2), we now obtain
S `
∧
j≤li
(zi,j = uj)→ Φ
p∧
j≤li
(z˙i,j = u˙j)q
 .
By substituting ti,j(~x, ~y) for uj , we obtain
S `
∧
j≤li
(zi,j = ti,j(~x, ~y))→ Φ
p∧
j≤li
(z˙i,j = ti,j(~˙x, ~˙y))q
 .
This means
S ` δi(~x, ~y)→ Φ(pδi(~˙x, ~˙y)q). (3)
Since PA ` ∀~x∀~y(δi(~x, ~y) → δ(~x, ~y)), S ` Φ(pδi(~˙x, ~˙y)q) → Φ(pδ(~˙x, ~˙y)q) by BU2 .
Therefore by (3), S ` δi(~x, ~y)→ Φ(pδ(~˙x, ~˙y)q). Since i < k is arbitrary, we have
S ` δ0(~x, ~y) ∨ · · · ∨ δk−1(~x, ~y)→ Φ(pδ(~˙x, ~˙y)q). It follows
S ` δ(~x, ~y)→ Φ(pδ(~˙x, ~˙y)q). (4)
Since PA ` ∀~x∀~y(δ(~x, ~y)→ σ(~x)), we have S ` Φ(pδ(~˙x, ~˙y)q)→ Φ(pσ(~˙x)q) by
BU2 . Hence by (4), S ` δ(~x, ~y)→ Φ(pσ(~˙x)q). Then S ` ∃~yδ(~x, ~y)→ Φ(pσ(~˙x)q).
We conclude S ` σ(~x)→ Φ(pσ(~˙x)q).
4 Witnesses for non-implications
In this section, we exhibit examples of formulas Φ(x) satisfying and not satisfy-
ing certain conditions. From these examples, several non-implications between
conditions are concluded.
Our first two propositions give examples of formulas which do not satisfy
D1. Proofs are easy and we omit them.
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Proposition 4.1. Let PrQ(x) be the provability predicate of Robinson’s arith-
metic Q.
1. PrQ(x) satisfies D2
G, Σ1C
G, CB and PCG.
2. PrQ(x) satisfies neither D1 nor B2.
3. PA ` ConHPrQ .
Proposition 4.2. Let Ψ(x) :≡ x 6= x.
1. Ψ(x) satisfies D2G, D3G, BU2 and CB.
2. Ψ(x) does not satisfy any of D1, ∆0C and PC.
3. PA ` ConHΨ .
Feferman [7] proved there exists a Π1 numeration pi(v) of T in T such that
ConHPrpi is provable in PA.
Fact 4.3 (Feferman [7]). Suppose S = T .
1. Prpi(x) is a Σ2 provability predicate satisfying D1
U, D2G, BU2 , Σ1C
G,
CB and PCG.
2. Prpi(x) does not satisfy D3.
3. PA ` ConHPrpi .
Mostowski (p. 24 in [19]) introduced the formula PrMT (x) :≡ ∃y(PrfT (x, y)∧
¬PrfT (p0 6= 0q, y)) as an example of a Σ1 provability predicate for which the sec-
ond incompleteness theorem does not hold. Notice that PrMT (x) is PA-provably
equivalent to PrT (x) ∧ x 6= p0 6= 0q because PA ` ∀x0∀x1∀y(PrfT (x0, y) ∧
PrfT (x1, y) → x0 = x1). The following proposition shows the situation for
PrMT (x).
Proposition 4.4.
1. PrMT (x) is a Σ1 provability predicate satisfying D1
U, Σ1C
G and PCG.
2. PrMT (x) does not satisfy any of D2, B2 and CB.
3. PA ` ConLPrMT and T 0 Con
H
PrMT
.
The existence of Rosser provability predicates satisfying some derivability
conditions were discussed by Bernardi and Montagna [4] and Arai [1]. They
proved that there exists a Rosser provability predicate satisfying D2G. Also
Arai proved the existence of a Rosser provability predicate satisfying D3G.
Strictly speaking, in Arai’s arguments, formulas are assumed to be in negation
normal form (see [1]). We fix a natural algorithm calculating a negation normal
form nnf(ϕ) of each formula ϕ satisfying nnf(¬¬ϕ) ≡ nnf(ϕ). Then we can
understand that Arai’s Rosser provability predicates PrA(x) are of the form
∃y(Prf(nnf(x), y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y¬Prf(nnf(¬˙x), z)) for some suitable proof predicate
Prf(x, y). Then PA ` ConHPrA always holds. Summarizing this observation,
Arai’s results are stated as follows.
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Fact 4.5 (Arai [1]). There exist Σ1 provability predicates Pr
A
1 (x) and Pr
A
2 (x)
of T with:
1. PrA1 (x) satisfies D1, D2
G and PA ` ConHPrA1 .
2. PrA2 (x) satisfies D1, D3
G and PA ` ConHPrA2 .
By Proposition 2.4.4, PrA1 (x) satisfies B2. By Theorems 2.7 and 2.20, and
Propositions 2.4, 2.13 and 2.14, PrA1 (x) does not satisfy any of D1
U, CB, BU2 ,
D3 and PC. By Theorems 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 and Proposition 2.4.4, PrA2 (x) does
not satisfy any of D2, B2, Σ1C and PC.
In [15], the author proved the existence of usual Rosser provability predicates
satisfying additional derivability conditions. That is to say,
Fact 4.6 (Kurahashi [15]). Suppose S = T . There exist Σ1 provability predicates
PrR1 (x), Pr
R
2 (x) and Pr
R
3 (x) of T with:
1. PrR1 (x) satisfies D1, D2
G, ∆0C
G and PA ` ConHPrR1 .
2. PrR2 (x) satisfies D1
U, CB, D2, ∆0C
G and PA ` ConLPrR2 .
3. PrR3 (x) satisfies D1
U, CB, B2, D3
G, ∆0C
G and PA ` ConLPrR3 , but does
not satisfy Σ1C.
As in Fact 4.5.1, PrR1 (x) satisfies B2, but does not satisfy any of D1
U, CB,
BU2 , D3 and PC. By Proposition 2.4.4, Pr
R
2 (x) satisfies B2, but does not satisfy
any of D2U, D3, BU2 and PC by Theorems 2.7 and 2.20, and Propositions 2.4.6
and 2.13.3. By Theorems 2.7 and 2.20 and Proposition 2.4, PrR3 (x) does not
satisfy any of D2, BU2 and PC.
In the remainder of this section, we introduce seven Σ1 provability predicates
PrIT (x), Pr
II
T (x), Pr
III
T (x), Pr
IV
T (x), Pr
V
T (x), Pr
VI
T (x) and Pr
∗(x) which indicate
several non-implications of the conditions. The first three provability predi-
cates are constructed in a similar way. Before introducing them, we prepare a
definition and a lemma.
Definition 4.7. Let δ(x, z) be a ∆1 formula.
1. PrfT [δ](x, y) :≡ PrfT (x, y) ∧ ∀z < y(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z)→ δ(x, z)).
2. PrT [δ](x) :≡ ∃yPrfT [δ](x, y).
Lemma 4.8. For any ∆1 formula δ(x, z),
1. PrT [δ](x) is a Σ1 provability predicate of T .
2. PA ` ∀x(∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z)→ δ(x, z))→ (PrT (x)↔ PrT [δ](x))).
3. If PA ` ∀x∀z(Fml(x) ∧ x ≤ z → δ(x, z)), then
PA ` ∀x∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) ∧ Fml(x) ∧ PrT [δ](x)→ δ(x, z)).
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Proof. 1. Let ϕ be any formula and let n be any natural number. Since PA `
∀z < n¬PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z), PA ` PrfT (pϕq, n) ↔ PrfT [δ](pϕq, n). Since this
equivalence is true in the standard model of arithmetic, we obtain that PA `
PrT (pϕq) if and only if PA ` PrT [δ](pϕq). It follows that PrT [δ](x) is also a Σ1
provability predicate of T .
2. This is immediate from the definition.
3. Suppose PA ` ∀x∀z(Fml(x) ∧ x ≤ z → δ(x, z)). By the definition of
PrfT [δ](x, y),
PA ` ∀x∀y∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) ∧ PrfT [δ](x, y) ∧ z < y → δ(x, z)). (5)
Since PA ` PrfT [δ](x, y) → PrfT (x, y) and PA ` PrfT (x, y) → x ≤ y, we have
PA ` PrfT [δ](x, y) → x ≤ y. Thus PA ` PrfT [δ](x, y) ∧ y ≤ z → x ≤ z. By the
supposition, PA ` Fml(x) ∧ PrfT [δ](x, y) ∧ y ≤ z → δ(x, z). From this with (5),
we obtain
PA ` ∀x∀y∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) ∧ Fml(x) ∧ PrfT [δ](x, y)→ δ(x, z)),
and hence
PA ` ∀x∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) ∧ Fml(x) ∧ PrT [δ](x)→ δ(x, z)).
Let Even(x) be a natural ∆1 formula saying that “x is the Go¨del number
of a formula containing an even number of logical symbols”. Proposition 4.9
shows that full local derivability conditions do not imply uniform derivability
conditions.
Proposition 4.9. There exists a Σ1 provability predicate Pr
I
T (x) of T with:
1. PrIT (x) satisfies D1, D2 and Σ1C.
2. PrIT (x) does not satisfy any of D1
U, D2U, D3U, ∆0C
U and PCU.
Proof. Let PrIT (x) :≡ PrT [x ≤ z ∨Even(x)](x). Then PrIT (x) is a Σ1 provability
predicate of T by Lemma 4.8.1. If PrIT (x) contains an even number of logical
symbols, we replace PrIT (x) with Pr
I
T (x)∧ 0 = 0. Then PrIT (x) contains an odd
number of logical symbols, and hence PA ` ∀x¬Even(pPrIT (x˙)q).
Let ϕ be any formula. Since PA ` ∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) → pϕq ≤ z ∨
Even(pϕq)), we have PA ` PrT (pϕq) ↔ PrIT (pϕq) by Lemma 4.8.2. Therefore
local derivability conditions for PrIT (x) are inherited from those for PrT (x).
We prove that PrIT (x) does not satisfy any of uniform derivability conditions.
Since PA ` ∀x∀z(Fml(x) ∧ x ≤ z → (x ≤ z ∨ Even(x))),
PA ` ∀x∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) ∧ Fml(x) ∧ PrIT (x)→ (x ≤ z ∨ Even(x)))
by Lemma 4.8.3. For the sake of simplicity, we deal with formulas whose only
free variable is x. Let ϕ(x) be such a formula. Then
PA ` ∀x∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z)∧PrIT (pϕ(x˙)q)→ (pϕ(x˙)q ≤ z∨Even(pϕ(x˙)q))).
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Since PA ` x ≤ pϕ(x˙)q, we obtain
PA ` ∀x∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) ∧ PrIT (pϕ(x˙)q)→ (x ≤ z ∨ Even(pϕ(x˙)q))).
(6)
• Since PA ` ∀x¬Even(p0 = 0 ∧ x˙ = x˙q),
PA ` ∀x∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z)→ (x ≤ z ∨ ¬PrIT (p0 = 0 ∧ x˙ = x˙q)))
by (6). Hence PA ` PrT (p0 6= 0q) → ∃x¬PrIT (p0 = 0 ∧ x˙ = x˙q) because
PA ` ∀z∃x(x > z). It follows S 0 ∀xPrIT (p0 = 0 ∧ x˙ = x˙q) because
S 0 ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q). This shows that PrIT (x) does not satisfy D1U.
• Let ϕ(x) and ψ(x) be formulas with PA ` ∀xEven(pϕ(x˙)q)∧∀x¬Even(pψ(x˙)q).
Then PA ` ∀xEven(pϕ(x˙) → ψ(x˙)q). Since PA ` PrT (p0 6= 0q) →
PrT (pϕ(x˙)→ ψ(x˙)q) ∧ PrT (pϕ(x˙)q), we have
PA ` PrT (p0 6= 0q)→ PrIT (pϕ(x˙)→ ψ(x˙)q) ∧ PrIT (pϕ(x˙)q)
by the choice of ϕ(x) and ψ(x), and the definition of PrfIT (x, y). If D2
U
holds for PrIT (x), then S ` PrT (p0 6= 0q) → PrIT (pψ(x˙)q). By (6), S `
PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) → (x ≤ z ∨ Even(pψ(x˙)q)), and hence S ` PrT (p0 6=
0q)→ ∃xEven(pψ(x˙)q). By the choice of ψ(x), we obtain S ` ¬PrT (p0 6=
0q). This is a contradiction. Therefore D2U does not hold for PrIT (x).
• Let ϕ(x) be a formula with PA ` ∀xEven(pϕ(x˙)q). Then PA ` PrT (p0 6=
0q) → PrIT (pϕ(x˙)q) as described above. If D3U holds for PrIT (x), then
S ` PrT (p0 6= 0q)→ PrIT (pPrIT (pϕ(x˙)q)q). By (6), we have S ` PrT (p0 6=
0q) → ∃xEven(pPrIT (pϕ(x˙)q)q). Since PrIT (x) contains an odd number of
logical symbols, ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q) is proved in S, and this is a contradiction.
Hence D3U does not hold for PrIT (x).
• As described above, PA ` PrT (p0 6= 0q) → ∃x¬PrIT (p0 = 0 ∧ x˙ = x˙q).
If S ` ∀x(0 = 0 ∧ x = x → PrIT (p0 = 0 ∧ x˙ = x˙q)) holds, then S `
PrT (p0 6= 0q)→ ∃x¬(0 = 0 ∧ x = x). This implies S ` ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q), a
contradiction. Therefore S 0 ∀x(0 = 0 ∧ x = x→ PrIT (p0 = 0 ∧ x˙ = x˙q)).
This shows that ∆0C
U does not hold for PrIT (x).
• PCU fails to hold because PA ` ∀xPr∅(p0 = 0 ∧ x˙ = x˙q).
By Proposition 2.4, PrIT (x) satisfies B2. Propositions 2.13.1 and 2.14.1 imply
that PrIT (x) satisfies neither B
U
2 nor CB.
Next we prove that full uniform derivability conditions do not imply any of
global derivability conditions except for D3G, and that full derivability condi-
tions are not sufficient for the unprovability of ConΣ1Φ even if Φ ∈ Σ1.
Proposition 4.10. There exists a Σ1 provability predicate Pr
II
T (x) of T with:
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1. PrIIT (x) satisfies D1
U, D2U, and Σ1C
U.
2. PrIIT (x) does not satisfy any of D2
G, ∆0C
G and PCG.
3. PA ` ConΣ1
PrIIT
.
Proof. For each formula ϕ, let n(ϕ) be the number of occurrences of the symbol
¬ in ϕ. We may use a function symbol n(x) corresponding to this function such
that PA ` ∀x(Fml(x)→ n(x) ≤ x).
Let PrIIT (x) be the Σ1 formula PrT [n(x) ≤ z ∨ Even(x)](x). Then PrIIT (x)
is a Σ1 provability predicate of T by Lemma 4.8.1. Let ϕ(~x) be any for-
mula. Then PA ` ∀~x(n(pϕ(~˙x)q) = k) for some natural number k. Since
PA ` ∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) → n(pϕ(~˙x)q) ≤ z ∨ Even(pϕ(~˙x)q)), we obtain PA `
∀~x(PrT (pϕ(~˙x)q) ↔ PrIIT (pϕ(~˙x)q)) by Lemma 4.8.2. Therefore PrIIT (x) satisfies
D1U, D2U and Σ1C
U.
By Lemma 4.8.3, we have
PA ` ∀x∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) ∧ Fml(x) ∧ PrIIT (x)→ (n(x) ≤ z ∨ Even(x)))
(7)
because PA ` ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ x ≤ z → n(x) ≤ z ∨ Even(x)).
As in Proposition 4.9, failure of D2G, ∆0C
G and PCG for PrIIT (x) fol-
low from (7) and the facts PA ` ∀z∃y(Fml(y) ∧ n(y) > z ∧ ¬Even(y)), PA `
∀z∃y(True∆0(y) ∧ n(y) > z ∧ ¬Even(y)) and PA ` ∀z∃y(Pr∅(y) ∧ n(y) > z ∧
¬Even(y)), respectively.
We prove PA ` ConΣ1
PrIIT
. By (7) and PA ` ∀z∃x(Σ1(x) ∧ Sent(x) ∧ n(x) >
z ∧ ¬Even(x)), we have
PA ` ∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z)→ ∃x(Σ1(x) ∧ Sent(x) ∧ ¬PrIIT (x))).
It follows PA ` PrIIT (p0 6= 0q) → ConΣ1PrIIT . On the other hand, obviously PA `
¬PrIIT (p0 6= 0q)→ ConΣ1PrIIT . Therefore we conclude PA ` Con
Σ1
PrIIT
.
From Propositions 2.13 and 2.14, PrIIT (x) satisfies B
U
2 , CB and PC
U. By
Theorem 2.7, T 0 ConLPrIIT .
We prove that the conditions Φ ∈ Σ1, D1U, D2G and Σ1CG are not suffi-
cient for the unprovability of Go¨del’s consistency statement ConGΦ .
Proposition 4.11. There exists a Σ1 provability predicate Pr
III
T (x) of T with:
1. PrIIIT (x) satisfies D1
U, D2G and Σ1C
G.
2. PA ` ConGPrIIIT .
Proof. Let PrIIIT (x) be the formula PrT [Σz(x)](x). Then by Lemma 4.8.1, Pr
III
T (x)
is a Σ1 provability predicate of T . For any formula ϕ(~x), we have PA `
∀z∀~x(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) → Σz(pϕ(~˙x)q)) because PA ` ∀z ≥ kΣz(pϕ(~˙x)q) for
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some natural number k. Hence PA ` PrT (pϕ(~˙x)q) ↔ PrIIIT (pϕ(~˙x)q) by Lemma
4.8.2. Thus D1U holds for PrIIIT (x).
Since PA ` ∀x∀z(Fml(x) ∧ x ≤ z → Σz(x)), we have
PA ` ∀x∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) ∧ Fml(x) ∧ PrIIIT (x)→ Σz(x)) (8)
by Lemma 4.8.3. Then
PA ` Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) ∧ PrIIIT (x→˙y)→ (PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z)→ Σz(x→˙y)).
Thus
PA ` Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) ∧ PrIIIT (x→˙y)→ ∀z(PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z)→ Σz(y)).
By Lemma 4.8.2,
PA ` Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) ∧ PrIIIT (x→˙y)→ (PrT (y)↔ PrIIIT (y)). (9)
Since PA ` PrIIIT (x→˙y) ∧ PrIIIT (x)→ PrT (x→˙y) ∧ PrT (x), we have
PA ` Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) ∧ PrIIIT (x→˙y) ∧ PrIIIT (x)→ PrT (y)
by D2G for PrT (x). From this with (9),
PA ` Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) ∧ PrIIIT (x→˙y) ∧ PrIIIT (x)→ PrIIIT (y).
This means D2G holds for PrIIIT (x).
Since PA ` TrueΣ1(x) → Σ1(x), PA ` TrueΣ1(x) → (PrfT (p0 6= 0q, z) →
Σz(x)). By Lemma 4.8.2, PA ` TrueΣ1(x) → (PrT (x) ↔ PrIIIT (x)). By Σ1CG
for PrT (x), we obtain PA ` TrueΣ1(x)→ PrIIIT (x).
By (8) and PA ` ∀z∃x(Fml(x) ∧ ¬Σz(x)), we have PA ` PrT (p0 6= 0q) →
∃x(Fml(x) ∧ ¬PrIIIT (x)). Thus PA ` PrT (p0 6= 0q) → ConGPrIIIT . On the other
hand, since PA ` ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q) → ¬PrIIIT (p0 6= 0q), we have PA ` ¬PrT (p0 6=
0q)→ ConGPrIIIT . Therefore PA ` Con
G
PrIIIT
.
By Propositions 2.13 and 2.14, PrIIIT (x) satisfies B
U
2 , CB and PC
U. Corol-
lary 2.28 implies that PCG fails to hold for PrIIIT (x) and T 0 Con
Σ1
PrIIIT
.
We prove that there exists a Σ1 provability predicate which satisfies the
Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions, but does not satisfy Σ1C. Al-
though such a Σ1 provability predicate is very fundamental in research on deriv-
ability conditions, it seems to have been unknown so far.
Proposition 4.12. There exists a Σ1 provability predicate Pr
IV
T (x) of T which
satisfies D1, D2G and D3G, but does not satisfy Σ1C.
Proof. By the Fixed Point Lemma, there exists a ∆1 formula Prf
′
T (v, x, y) sat-
isfying the following equivalence:
PA ` Prf ′T (v, x, y)↔ PrfT (x, y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y(PrfT (¬˙v, z)→ ξ(v, x) ∨ η(x, z)),
where
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• ξ(v, x) ≡ ∃u ≤ x(x = p∃y0Prf ′T (v˙, u˙, y0)q);
• η(x, z) ≡ ∃w0, w1, w2 ≤ z(PrfT (w0, w1) ∧ PrfT (w0→˙x,w2)).
Also by the Fixed Point Lemma, there exists a Σ1 sentence σ satisfying
PA ` σ ↔ ∃z(PrfT (p¬σq, z) ∧ ∀y < z¬Prf ′T (pσq, pσq, y) ∧ ¬η(pσq, z)).
Let PrfIVT (x, y) :≡ Prf ′T (pσq, x, y) and let PrIVT (x) :≡ ∃y0PrfIVT (x, y0). Then
• PA ` PrfIVT (x, y)
↔ PrfT (x, y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y(PrfT (p¬σq, z)→ ξ(pσq, x) ∨ η(x, z)),
where ξ(pσq, x) ≡ ∃u ≤ x(x = pPrIVT (u˙)q).
• PA ` σ ↔ ∃z(PrfT (p¬σq, z) ∧ ∀y < z¬PrfIVT (pσq, y) ∧ ¬η(pσq, z)).
First, we prove T 0 ¬σ. If T ` ¬σ, then for some natural number p,
PA ` PrfT (p¬σq, p). Since T 0 σ, PA ` ∀y < p¬PrfT (pσq, y). Since PrfIVT (x, y)
implies PrfT (x, y), we have PA ` ∀y < p¬PrfIVT (pσq, y). Also there is no formula
γ such that both γ and γ → σ are T -provable. Thus PA ` ¬η(pσq, p). Then
PA ` σ by the definition of σ. This is a contradiction. Therefore T 0 ¬σ.
It follows that for any natural number n, PA ` ¬PrfT (p¬σq, n). Then for
any formula ϕ, PA ` PrfT (pϕq, n) ↔ PrfIVT (pϕq, n). Thus PrIVT (x) is a Σ1
provability predicate of T .
Let t(x, y) be a primitive recursive term such that PA ` x ≤ t(x, y) ∧ y ≤
t(x, y), and
PA ` Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) ∧ PrfT (x, v0) ∧ PrfT (x→˙y, v1)→ PrfT (y, t(v0, v1)).
We also have
PA ` PrfT (x, v0) ∧ PrfT (x→˙y, v1)→ η(y, t(v0, v1)).
Thus
PA ` Fml(x)∧ Fml(y)∧PrfIVT (x, v0)∧PrfIVT (x→˙y, v1)→ PrfIVT (y, t(v0, v1)).
It follows that D2G holds for PrIVT (x).
Since PA ` ξ(pσq, pPrIVT (x˙)q)), we obtain
PA ` PrT (pPrIVT (x˙)q)↔ PrIVT (pPrIVT (x˙)q).
Therefore D3G for PrIVT (x) follows from Σ1C
U for PrT (x).
Al last, we prove that Σ1C fails to hold for Pr
IV
T (x). By the choice of
PrfIVT (x, y),
PA ` PrfIVT (pσq, y) ∧ PrfT (p¬σq, z) ∧ z ≤ y → ξ(pσq, pσq) ∨ η(pσq, z).
Since σ is not of the form PrIVT (pϕq), we have PA ` ¬ξ(pσq, pσq), and hence
PA ` PrfIVT (pσq, y) ∧ PrfT (p¬σq, z) ∧ z ≤ y → η(pσq, z).
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The it follows
PA ` PrfIVT (pσq, y)→ ∀z(PrfT (p¬σq, z)→ (y < z∧PrfIVT (pσq, y))∨η(pσq, z)).
This means
PA ` PrfIVT (pσq)→ ¬σ
by the definition of σ.
If S ` σ → PrIVT (pσq), then S ` σ → ¬σ, and thus S ` ¬σ. This is a
contradiction. We conclude S 0 σ → PrIVT (pσq).
By Proposition 2.4, Theorem 2.20, Proposition 2.13.3 and Proposition 2.14.1,
PrIVT (x) does not satisfy any of PC, B
U
2 , D1
U and CB.
The next two propositions show that {D1,Σ1C} and {D1,PC} are incom-
parable. Our proof of Proposition 4.13 is analogous to that of Proposition 4.12.
Proposition 4.13. There exists a Σ1 provability predicate Pr
V
T (x) of T which
satisfies Σ1C
G, but does not satisfy D1U and PC.
Proof. Let T0 be any finite subtheory of T containing Q with
∧
T0 is not a Π1
sentence. Let Prf ′T (v, x, y) be the ∆1 formula
PrfT (x, y) ∧ (∃z ≤ yPrfT (¬˙v, z)→ Σ1(x)).
By the Fixed Point Lemma, there exists a Σ1 sentence σ satisfying
PA ` σ ↔ ∃z(PrfT (p¬σq, z) ∧ ∀y < z¬Prf ′T (pσq, p
∧
T0 → σq, y)).
Let PrfVT (x, y) :≡ Prf ′T (pσq, x, y) and let PrVT (x) :≡ ∃yPrfVT (x, y). Then
• PA ` PrfVT (x, y)↔ PrfT (x, y) ∧ (∃z ≤ yPrfT (p¬σq, z)→ Σ1(x)).
• PA ` σ ↔ ∃z(PrfT (p¬σq, z) ∧ ∀y < z¬PrfVT (p
∧
T0 → σq, y)).
As in our proof of Proposition 4.12, we can prove T 0 ¬σ. And hence PrVT (x)
is also a Σ1 provability predicate of T . Since PA ` Σ1(x)→ (PrT (x)↔ PrVT (x))
by the definition, Σ1C
G for PrVT (x) easily follows from Σ1C
G for PrT (x).
We prove that PC fails to hold for PrVT (x). If PC holds for Pr
V
T (x), then
S ` Pr∅(p
∧
T0 → σq) → PrVT (p
∧
T0 → σq). By formalized deduction theorem,
S ` Pr[T0](pσq)→ PrVT (p
∧
T0 → σq). By Σ1C for Pr[T0](x),
S ` σ → PrVT (p
∧
T0 → σq). (10)
By the definition of PrfVT (x, y), we obtain
PA ` PrfVT (p
∧
T0 → σq, y) ∧ PrfT (p¬σq, z) ∧ z ≤ y → Σ1(p
∧
T0 → σq).
Since
∧
T0 → σ is not Σ1,
PA ` PrfVT (p
∧
T0 → σq, y) ∧ PrfT (p¬σq, z)→ y < z.
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It follows
PA ` PrVT (p
∧
T0 → σq)→ ∀z(PrfT (p¬σq, z)→ ∃y < zPrfVT (p
∧
T0 → σq, y)).
This means PA ` PrVT (p
∧
T0 → σq) → ¬σ. From this with (10), S ` σ → ¬σ,
and hence S ` ¬σ. This is a contradiction. Therefore PrVT (x) does not satisfy
PC.
Finally, we prove that PrVT (x) does not satisfy D1
U. Let ϕ(x) be any formula
such that PA ` ∀x¬Σ1(pϕ(x˙)q) and T ` ∀xϕ(x). Since PA ` PrfT (pϕ(z˙)q, y)→
z ≤ y, we have PA ` PrVT (pϕ(z˙)q) ∧ PrfT (p¬σq, z) → Σ1(pϕ(z˙)q) by the
definition of PrfVT (x, y). Hence PA ` PrVT (pϕ(z˙)q) → ¬PrfT (p¬σq, z). Then
PA ` ∀xPrVT (pϕ(x˙)q)→ ¬PrT (p¬σq). Since T 0 ¬PrT (p¬σq), we conclude that
T 0 ∀xPrVT (pϕ(x˙)q).
By Propositions 2.4 and 2.14. PrVT (x) does not satisfy any of D2, B2 and
CB.
We give an example of Mostowski-like Σ1 provability predicate which satisfies
PCG but does not satisfy Σ1C.
Proposition 4.14. There exists a Σ1 provability predicate Pr
VI
T (x) of T with:
1. PrVIT (x) satisfies D1
U, D3G, ∆0C
G and PCG.
2. PrVIT (x) satisfies neither Σ1C nor CB.
Proof. Let ξ be a Π1 sentence undecidable in T such as Rosser’s sentence (see
[16]), and let ξ′ be the sentence ξ ∨ 0 = s(0) which is also undecidable in T . Let
PrVIT (x) :≡ PrT (x) ∧ x 6= p¬ξ′q. Obviously,
PA ` ∀x(x 6= p¬ξ′q→ (PrT (x)↔ PrVIT (x))). (11)
Since ¬ξ′ is not provable in T , PrVIT (x) is a Σ1 provability predicate of
T , and also D1U holds for PrVIT (x). The conditions D3
G and ∆0C
G follow
from PA ` ∀x(pPrVIT (x˙)q 6= p¬ξ′q) and PA ` ∀x(True∆0(x) → x 6= p¬ξ′q),
respectively.
We prove PCG. Let M be an LA-structure whose domain is a singleton {e}.
Then for every closed LA-term t, tM = e. Thus M |= ξ ∨ 0 = s(0). Therefore
¬ξ′ is not provable in predicate calculus. The above argument can be formalized
in PA, and so PA ` ∀x(Fml(x) → (Pr∅(x) → x 6= p¬ξ′q)). Then by PCG for
PrT (x), we conclude PA ` ∀x(Fml(x)→ (Pr∅(x)→ PrVIT (x))).
Since PA ` ¬PrVIT (p¬ξ′q) and T 0 ξ′, we can prove S 0 PrVIT (p∀x¬(ξ ∨ x =
s(0))q)→ ∀xPrVIT (p¬(ξ ∨ x˙ = s(0))q) by (11). The conditions Σ1C and CB fail
to hold because of them.
By Proposition 2.4, PrVIT (x) satisfies neither D2 nor B2.
At last, we prove that our Theorem 2.20 is actually an improvement of
Buchholz’s theorem (Theorem 2.18).
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Theorem 4.15. There exists a Σ1 provability predicate Pr
∗(x) of PA which
satisfies D1U, BU2 , Σ1C
G and PCG but does not satisfy D2.
This theorem is proved by using Beklemishev’s arithmetical completeness
theorem of the bimodal logic CS2 with respect to independent Σ1 numerations
(see Beklemishev [3]). For this, we need some preparations. The language of
CS2 is that of propositional logic equipped with two unary modal operators [0]
and [1]. Formulas in this language are called CS2-formulas. The axioms of the
bimodal logic CS2 are propositional tautologies and the formulas [i](p → q) →
([i]p→ [i]q), [i]p→ [j][i]p and [i]([i]p→ p)→ [i]p for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. The inference
rules of CS2 are modus ponens
A, A→ B
B
, necessitation
A
[i]A
for i ∈ {0, 1},
and uniform substitution.
We say a structure M = (W,K0,K1,≺,, b) is a CS2-model if it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. W is a nonempty finite set.
2. K0 and K1 are subsets of W with W = K0 ∪K1.
3. ≺ is a strict partial ordering over W .
4. b ∈ K0 ∩K1 and b ≺ x for all x ∈W \ {b}.
5.  is a binary relation between W and the set of all CS2-formulas such that
 satisfies the usual conditions for satisfaction and the following condition:
for i ∈ {0, 1}, x  [i]A if and only if for all y ∈ Ki, if x ≺ y, then y  A.
A CS2-formula A is said to be true in a CS2-model M = (W,K0,K1,≺,, b) if
b  A. The modal logic CS2 is sound and complete with respect to CS2 models.
Theorem 4.16 (See Smoryn´ski [21]). For any CS2-formula A, the following
are equivalent:
1. CS2 ` A.
2. A is true in all CS2-models.
Let α0(v) and α1(v) be any Σ1 numerations of PA. A mapping f from
CS2-formulas to LA-sentences is a (α0, α1)-interpretation if f commutes with
each propositional connective, and f([i]A) ≡ Prαi(pf(A)q) for i ∈ {0, 1}. Bek-
lemishev proved that CS2 is sound and complete with respect to this kind of
interpretations.
Theorem 4.17 (The arithmetical completeness theorem of CS2 (Beklemishev
[3])). For any CS2-formula A, the following are equivalent:
1. CS2 ` A.
2. For any Σ1 numerations α0(v) and α1(v) of PA and any (α0, α1)-interpretation
f , PA ` f(A).
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We are ready to prove Theorem 4.15.
Proof of Theorem 4.15. Let us consider a CS2-model M = (W,K0,K1,≺,, b)
satisfying the following conditions:
1. W = {b, x0, x1},
2. K0 = {b, x0} and K1 = {b, x1},
3. ≺= {(b, x0), (b, x1)},
4. x0  p and x1 1 p.
Then b  [0]p∧ [1]¬p∧¬[0]⊥∧¬[1]⊥. Thus CS2 0 [0]p∧ [1]¬p→ [0]⊥∨ [1]⊥.
By the arithmetical completeness theorem of CS2, there are Σ1 numerations
α0(v) and α1(v) of PA, and a (α0, α1)-interpretation f such that PA 0 f([0]p ∧
[1]¬p→ [0]⊥ ∨ [1]⊥). Let ξ :≡ f(p), then
PA 0 Prα0(pξq) ∧ Prα1(p¬ξq)→ ¬ConPrα0 ∨ ¬ConPrα1 . (12)
Let Pr∗(x) be the Σ1 formula Prα0(x)∨Prα1(x). Then Pr∗(x) is obviously a
Σ1 provability predicate of PA. Moreover D1
U, Σ1C
G and PCG are inherited
from Prα0(x).
First, we prove that Pr∗(x) satisfies BU2 . Suppose PA ` ∀~x(ϕ(~x) → ψ(~x)).
Then since both Prα0(x) and Prα1(x) satisfy B
U
2 , we have
PA ` Prα0(pϕ(~˙x)q)→ Prα0(pψ(~˙x)q) and PA ` Prα1(pϕ(~˙x)q)→ Prα1(pψ(~˙x)q).
By the definition of Pr∗(x),
PA ` Prα0(pϕ(~˙x)q)→ Pr∗(pψ(~˙x)q) and PA ` Prα1(pϕ(~˙x)q)→ Pr∗(pψ(~˙x)q).
Therefore we conclude
PA ` ∀~x(Pr∗(pϕ(~˙x)q)→ Pr∗(pψ(~˙x)q)).
At last, we prove that Pr∗(x) does not satisfy D2. Suppose, towards a
contradiction,
PA ` Pr∗(pξ → 0 6= 0q)→ (Pr∗(pξq)→ Pr∗(p0 6= 0q)).
Then by the definition of Pr∗(x),
PA ` Prα0(p¬ξq)∨Prα1(p¬ξq)→ (Prα0(pξq)∨Prα1(pξq)→ ¬ConPrα0∨¬ConPrα1 ).
By logic, we obtain
PA ` Prα0(pξq) ∧ Prα1(p¬ξq)→ ¬ConPrα0 ∨ ¬ConPrα1 .
This contradicts to (12). Therefore we conclude
PA 0 Pr∗(pξ → 0 6= 0q)→ (Pr∗(pξq)→ Pr∗(p0 6= 0q)).
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By Proposition 2.14.2, Pr∗(x) satisfies CB.
As we have seen, examples of formulas given in this section show several non-
implications between conditions. For instance, the following non-implications
related to Proposition 2.4 are also obtained.
1. ∆0C 6⇒ D1 (Proposition 4.1).
2. {Bm : m ≥ 2} 6⇒ D1 (Proposition 4.2).
For all m ≥ 2, D1 6⇒ Bm (Proposition 4.4).
3. For all m ≥ 1, D2 6⇒ Bm (Proposition 4.1).
4. D3 6⇒∆0C (Proposition 4.2).
However, we do not have enough such non-implications between conditions
including uniform and global versions. We close this paper with the following
problem.
Problem 4.18. Study further non-implications between derivability conditions.
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